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Determining Ripeness of Substantive Due Process Claims 
Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments 
David S. Mendel 
INTRODUCTION 
Landowners who sustain economic harm from arbitrary and capri­
cious applications of land use regulations1 may sue the local govern­
ment entities responsible for applying those regulations under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983,2 alleging that the local government entities deprived them of 
substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 A 
landowner who brings this claim - an "as-applied arbitrary and capri­
cious substantive due process" claim4 - may in appropriate cases seek 
1. Local governments commonly rely on boards, commissions, and individual offi­
cials and employees to regulate land use. These government agents apply regulations 
when they review applications by landowners for variances and special exceptions, 
rezonings, building and occupancy permits, and approvals of subdivisions and other de­
velopments. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CON­
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 193-204, 447-652 (4th ed. 1995) (presenting a typical 
zoning ordinance and describing its application). 
2. Section 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Landowners may sue local governments under § 1983. See 
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1968) (holding that municipalities 
are "persons" for purposes of§ 1983). 
3. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that application of 
zoning regulations to individual parcels of land must be consistent with substantive due 
process); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.  365 (1926). The Fourteenth 
Amendment states, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
4. See, e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1990) (iden­
tifying substantive due process claim where plaintiff alleges that regulation is "arbitrary 
and capricious, does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare, and is therefore an invalid exercise of the police power"). As ex­
plained by the court in Eide, a plaintiff may bring a "facial" challenge to the regulation 
as well as an "as-applied" challenge. See 908 F.2d at 722. All references to substantive 
due process claims in this Note, unless otherwise indicated, are to claims alleging that 
regulations are arbitrary and capricious as applied to the plaintiff's particular piece of 
property. 
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declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees.5 Despite 
controversy among courts and commentators over both the definition of 
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause6 and the stan-
Two other species of due process claims available to landowners are the procedural 
due process claim, see, e.g. , Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584, 589-90 
(6th Cir. 1992), and the claim that regulation constitutes a "taking" of property without 
due process - sometimes referred to as a "due process takings claim." See Eide, 908 
F.2d at 721. Landowners may also allege that the government regulations constitute 
"takings" of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Four­
teenth Amendments - a "just compensation claim" - or that regulations deprive 
them of equal protection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Eide, 908 F.2d 
at 720-24 (cataloguing different constitutional claims available to landowners). 
The due process takings claim and the Fifth Amendment just compensation claim 
are fundamentally similar, because both require the landowner to prove that the govern­
ment has regulated the property so as to deprive the landowner of all reasonable benefi­
cial use of her land. The only practical difference between the two claims is that in a 
due process takings claim the landowner seeks an invalidation of the offending regula­
tion and perhaps actual damages, rather than compensation for the value of her property. 
See Eide, 908 F.2d at 721; Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the 
Timing of Development: Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to 
Growth Control Regulations, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1205, 1231 (1991). This Note will 
refer to "takings" claims without necessarily indicating whether they are due process 
takings claims or just compensation claims. 
However, care should be taken to distinguish the due process takings claim from 
the as-applied arbitrary and capricious substantive due process claim, the one under 
scrutiny in this Note. Although both claims nominally come under the label of substan­
tive due process, they are based on different legal foundations. See Southview Assocs. 
v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1992); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Note, The Applica­
bility of Just Compensation to Substantive Due Process Claims, 100 YALE L.J. 2667, 
2670 (1991). Whereas the former requires the showing that a regulation has gone so far 
that it effectively robs the landowner of the economic value of her property, the latter 
focuses on whether the regulation, or its application, is "arbitrary and capricious" and 
unrelated to the advancement of legitimate governmental interests. See Del Montes 
Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1990); Eide, 908 F.2d at 
721-22; Stone & Seymour, supra, at 1231. 
5. See Eide, 908 F.2d at 720; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
§ 8.11, at 514 (2d ed. 1994); MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 189. 
6. Constitutionally protected property interests "are not created by the Constitution 
but are 'defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law' and arise only where the plaintiff demonstrates a 'legitimate 
claim of entitlement.' " Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). In cases involving challenges to 
zoning decisions, the property interest - the ownership interest in the land itself - "is 
often assumed without discussion." Polenz, 883 F.2d at 556. But in some of these 
cases, and often in cases involving challenges to denials of permits, courts require the 
plaintiff to prove an entitlement to a particular use of her land in order to bring a sub­
stantive due process claim. See, e.g., Polenz, 883 F.2d at 556; Decarion v. Monroe 
County, 853 F. Supp. 1415, 1418-19 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (determining conditions of a 
"vested property right" under Florida law); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 
§ 2.36, at 57 (3d ed. 1993) (calling requirement of proof of entitlement a "minority 
rule"); David H. Armistead, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' 
Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769, 784 & n.85 
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dard of conduct required of local governments under that clause, 7 the 
as-applied substantive due process claim can serve as an effective 
weapon for landowners who seek redress for alleged arbitrary and ca­
pricious behavior by local governments.8 Moreover, like other constitu­
tional claims available to landowners, substantive due process claims 
potentially increase the litigation costs and exposure to liability9 of local 
(199S) (noting disagreement among courts and commentators "as to whether courts 
should require a state-grounded property interest before finding a violation of an indi­
vidual's substantive due process rights"). Other courts go even further by suggesting 
that plaintiffs must have a property interest that is "fundamental." See Chesterfield 
Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he conven­
tional planning dispute - at least when not tainted with fundamental procedural irregu­
larity, racial animus, or the like - which takes place within the framework of an admit­
tedly valid state subdivision scheme is a matter primarily of concern to the state and 
does not implicate the Constitution." (citation omitted)); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Pro­
tection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of 
Substantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 316, 346-47 (1991) (noting un­
certainty in lower courts as to whether arbitrary decisions affecting purely economic 
rights may be successfully challenged under substantive due process). 
7. See MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 2.36, at S7 (comparing the "traditional ra­
tional relationship" test with the "shock the conscience" test); Richard H. Fallon, Some 
Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 
COLUM. L. REv. 309, 325-26 (1993); Stone & Seymour, supra, note 4, at 1225-27, 
1231; Armistead, supra note 6, at 809-lS. 
8. See Marks v. Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 1989) (city council's de­
nial of permit to owner of house after town members expressed "religious objections" 
to the owner's plans to open a palmistry constituted substantive due process violation); 
Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1988) (government's rejections of nu­
merous plat applications, rejection of application for building permit, and proposed zone 
change on property which would prevent plaintiff from developing property constituted 
the "sort of arbitrary administration of the local regulations, which singles out one indi­
vidual to be treated discriminatorily, [and] amount[ed] to a violation of that individual's 
substantive due process rights"); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (county supervisory board's finding that plaintiff's proposed subdivision was 
inconsistent with general plan and board's subsequent downzoning of property violated 
due process), as amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988); cf. Bruce I. Wiener, Comment, Obsta­
cles and Pitfalls for Landowners: Applying the Ripeness Doctrine to Section 1983 Land 
Use Litigation, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 387, 39S (1992) (opining that because of 
the availability of attorney's fees and because plaintiffs need not bring their claims in 
state court before suing in federal court, "[s]ection 1983 is an important source of re­
dress for landowners who wish to vindicate their rights against the government"). But 
see Dan Tarlock, Lacal Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 
U. Cm. L. REv. SSS, S92 (1993) (commenting that substantive due process "has ceased 
to be a meaningful limitation on government regulations except in abuse of process 
cases and the relatively rare cases where a local government imposes land use regula­
tion to cloak another, usually constitutionally suspect, purpose"). 
9. According to one commentator, a "driving factor" of the upward trend of pub­
lic sector litigation costs is the "explosion in the non-traditional use of civil rights stat­
utes - most important, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971 - to include 
cases involving such areas as zoning and land development." Susan A. Macmanus, The 
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governments and their individual agents10 who seek to implement land 
use regulations. 11 
However, the effectiveness of the substantive due process claim as 
a check on arbitrary government regulation and the related increase in 
costs imposed upon local governments by the claim largely depend 
upon when federal courts find the claim "ripe" for judicial review. The 
ripeness doctrine, as utilized by courts in the land use context, requires 
Impact of Litigation on Municipalities: Total Cost, Driving Factors, and Cost Contain­
ment Mechanisms, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 833, 836-37 (1993) (citation omitted). 
Litigation costs and potential liability may increase even if government agents do 
not behave arbitrarily or capriciously toward landowners, because of the need to defend 
against and settle meritless suits. See id. at 838 (stating that 48.2% of respondents to 
survey listed an overall increase in frivolous suits as a primary cause of increased litiga­
tion costs born by municipalities). Governments will often settle meritless claims in or­
der to avoid legal fees and unwanted controversy. See id. at 842 (stating that 81.4% of 
respondents to survey "acknowledge they settle at least some of their 'winnable' cases 
just to save money"). 
For a description of the impact of meritless lawsuits brought against non­
governmental individuals and groups and public officials, see Jennifer E. Sills, Com­
ment, SLAPPS (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation): How Can the Legal 
System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 547 (1993). Sills defines a SLAPP 
suit as a "meritless action filed by a plaintiff whose primary goal is not to win the case 
but rather to silence or intimidate citizens or public officials who have participated in 
proceedings regarding public policy or public decision making. " Id. at 548-49. Twenty­
five percent of these suits, which often "masquerade" as constitutional civil rights vio­
lations, relate to development and zoning. See id. at 547 (citation omitted). 
10. Under § 1983, landowners may sue officials and employees of local govern­
ments in their individual capacities unless these individuals are protected by qualified or 
absolute immunity. See, e.g., Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (involving developer's § 1983 action against township, its officials, and its 
employees alleging violation of its substantive due process rights in connection with de­
velopment of specific lots in industrial park). Although this Note generally will refer 
only to the liability of local governments, it assumes that what is true for the liability of 
governments often may extend to the liability of the agents of these governments in 
their individual capacities. 
11. For a comparison of the liability imposed upon local governments by regula­
tory takings claims and substantive due process claims, see Gregory M. Stein, Regula­
tory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1, 82 (1995). Cf. 
Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New 
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 740-41 (1988) (summarizing 
views of advocates who fear that the Supreme Court's decisions in regulatory takings 
cases will have "chilling effect" on land use regulation). Professor Stein comments as 
follows: 
Unlike takings compensation, due process damages resemble tort damages, and 
the plaintiff will have to prove her actual injuries arising from the deprivation. 
These damages might include increased interest rates resulting from municipal 
delay, fees for extensions of land option contracts and loan and contractual com­
mitments, and losses incurred as prospective tenants seek other space. Due pro­
cess damages could be substantial in some cases, but typically will be smaller in 
amount than regulatory takings compensation. 
Stein, supra, at 82. 
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that local governments have one or more opportunities to apply regula­
tions to the properties of landowners before being held liable for arbi­
trary and capricious behavior in federal court. As a result, a court's ap­
proach to determining ripeness has significant practical consequences 
for local governments and landowners. An underdeveloped ripeness 
standard - one that allows landowners to quickly bypass local 
processes to sue in federal court - likely increases the exposure to lia­
bility and litigation costs of local governments and individual govern­
ment agents. Consequently land use regulators will become more timid 
in applying and enforcing regulations.12 Hence, an underdeveloped ripe­
ness standard may hinder efforts by local governments to perform regu­
latory functions that are vital to the health and safety of communities 
and the protection of the environment.13 
On the other hand, an overdeveloped ripeness standard may pro­
vide incentives to local governments to neglect the concerns of land­
owners who believe they i;ire being treated unfairly. Local governments, 
often vulnerable to political pressures in making land use decisions, 
may violate the substantive due process rights of landowners, and then 
rely on lengthy local appeals processes to forestall suit in federal 
court.14 Landowners of limited financial means may not be able to en­
dure the lengthy administrative processes and litigation and may simply 
give up on their development plans. "Somehow," one commentator ob­
serves, "a right which is only available to those with the intestinal forti­
tude and economic staying power to hire counsel and pay them to con­
duct difficult, protracted litigation loses some of its luster."15 
12. See Sills, supra note 9, at 550 (describing adverse effects of litigation costs on 
implementation of land use regulations). An underdeveloped ripeness standard contrib­
utes to both higher litigation costs and higher potential liability, because it deprives the 
government of an opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Increased costs also may re­
sult from a greater number of frivolous claims filed by developers seeking to intimidate 
local governments into approving their land use proposals. See supra note 9. 
13. For a description of some of the functions of local land use regulation, see 
Tarlock, supra note 8, at 555-56, 559, 575. 
14. See Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation 
of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 22 (1992) (com­
plaining, in context of ripeness standard for takings claims, that "[d]elay has become a 
well-honed, tactical weapon of the government . . . . Fueled by judicial apathy and 
funded by tax dollars, government has the 'deep pockets' to string out litigation."). 
15. Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in the Federal Courts, 1993 ALI­
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: INvERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT 
LIABILITY 41, 43; (discussing ripeness test for takings claims); see also Kassouni, 
supra note 14, at 22 (warning that ripeness standard for takings claims imposes " 'chil­
ling effect' on private property" owners, particularly those in the middle class). Even 
landowners who eventually secure relief through a local appeals process may incur sig­
nificant, unrecouped losses because of the delays. Cf. John Mixon, Compensation 
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Courts disagree over the test for determining ripeness of substan­
tive due process claims brought by landowners against local govem­
ments.16 One approach makes ripeness a nonissue; it holds that "the 
very existence of an allegedly unlawful zoning action, without more, 
makes a substantive due process claim ripe for federal adjudication."17 
A second approach requires the landowner to obtain a "final decision" 
by local authorities regarding the landowner's desired use of the land 
under existing regulations. A final decision under this second approach 
consists of a rejected initial application by the landowner for the desired 
change in the use of the property - the "initial application" compo­
nent.18 A third approach also adopts the requirement of a final decision 
Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-Use Regulations: A Proposal 
for More Efficient State Level Adjudication, 20 URB. LAW. 675, 681 (1988) ("A contin­
uing wrongful denial of development permission can generate enormous consequential 
damages from loss of development opportunity, lost profits, lost sales, expired options, 
and accumulated interest"). 
16. Federal courts agree that facial substantive due process claims, see supra note 
4, are not subject to ripeness requirements that some courts impose for as-applied 
claims. See, e.g., Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 723 (11th Cir. 1990). 
17. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 
1991)); see also Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198, 201 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
Although the court in Pearson appeared to think that its holding regarding the ripeness 
of substantive due process claims was following precedent, actually it was creating a 
new rule of law for the circuit The Pearson court wrongly cited Nasierowski for the 
proposition that a substantive due process claim was ripe as soon as the wrongful event 
occurred; Nasierowksi was concerned with claims for violations of procedural due pro­
cess, not substantive due process. See Nasierowski, 949 F.2d at 894. 
18. See Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a hearing before the public improvements committee satis­
fied finality requirement, even though plaintiff had not sought a variance from the board 
of zoning adjustment or director of planning). Although the Eleventh Circuit has never 
expressly stated that the finality requirement for substantive due process claims does not 
include a variance component, it has held numerous claims to be ripe even though the 
landowners had not pursued variances. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland 
Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir. 1994) ("A property owner's rights are violated 
the moment a governmental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies that arbitrary 
action to the owner's property.") (citation omitted); Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin 
County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1538-39, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991); Eide, 908 F.2d at 726 (stating 
that it could "conceive of an arbitrary and capricious due process claim in which the fi­
nal decision requirement would be satisfied with a single arbitrary act"). Moreover, the 
Sixth Circuit has confirmed the difference between the Eleventh Circuit's weak finality 
requirement and the approach by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits which requires a vari­
ance. See Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1215. But see Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 
1535, 1536 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (characterizing as dicta Eide's suggestion that some cir­
cumstances will give rise to only a weak finality requirement and reiterating that ripe­
ness requires a "final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the prop­
erty at issue" (citation omitted)). 
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but holds that the final decision consists of not only a rejected initial 
application but also a rejected application for a variance19 or other ad­
ministrative relief - the "variance" component.20 A fourth approach 
constructs yet another version of finality; it requires the initial applica­
tion and variance components and also at least one rejection of a reap­
plication for a change in the use of the property, where the additional 
proposed use is less ambitious than the one requested in the initial ap­
plication - the "reapplication" component.21 Courts applying the third 
and fourth approaches have recognized a "futility exception," which 
excuses the landowner from either the variance or reapplication compo­
nents if the government has made clear that pursuit of these avenues 
would be useless.22 
This Note argues that the ripeness test for substantive due process 
claims should include a finality requirement that consists of initial ap­
plication and variance components but not a reapplication component, 
and a futility exception that extends to the variance component. Part I 
describes the theoretical justifications for the ripeness doctrine. Part II 
argues that the ripeness test created by the Supreme Court for regula-
19. Jn most local jurisdictions, a "variance" is an administrative remedy available 
to landowners who suffer "unnecessary hardships" as a result of applications of land 
use ordinances to their properties. See generally MANDELKER ET AL •• supra note 1, at 
455-68. 
20. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1495 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended, 857 
F.2d 567 (1988); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1988); 
cf. Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 973, 976-77 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring finality but 
holding here that plaintiff need not apply for a variance or take other measures because 
he had already secured a final decision on his development plans; plaintiff had only to 
appeal rejection of application for building permit before claim became ripe); Taylor 
Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring 
finality, which in this case meant plaintiff had to appeal denial of use permits). 
21. See Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 99 (2d Cir. 1992); Southern 
Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Del 
Montes Dunes, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990) (employ­
ing "the same final decision requirement that applies to regulatory takings claims" 
without having to decide reapplication issue); Landmark Land Co. v. Buchanan, 874 
F.2d 717, 722 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The final local decision which must be reviewed 
for arbitrariness is the decision to allow a particular level of development ."). 
22. For an example of a decision applying the futility exception under the third ap­
proach, see Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569. For decisions applying the futility exception 
under the fourth approach, see Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504 and Del Monte Dunes, 
920 F.2d at 1501-02. As a general matter, the landowner carries a high burden of proof 
that any of the finality components would be useless. See Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d 
at 99 (holding that futility exception was not met because state's Environmental Board 
had indicated that it still might accept alternate plans). 
According to the court in Eide, it might even be possible under the second ap­
proach for the futility exception to excuse the initial application component. See Eide, 
908 F.2d at 726-27 n.17 (declining to resolve this issue). 
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tory takings cases supports a finality requirement for substantive due 
process claims that consists of initial application and variance compo­
nents. Just as the Supreme Court has held that a local government does 
not "take" property until it finally decides how the regulations affect 
the property, lower courts should hold that a government does not 
"act" arbitrarily and capriciously until all relevant governmental agents 
determine that existing regulations do not permit the landowner's de­
sired use for the property. Part III argues that broad policies related to 
the quality, efficiency, and propriety of judicial decisionmaking also 
justify this same finality requirement. Part IV overcomes theoretical and 
practical objections to the finality requirement proposed in this Note, 
including the objection that the requirement runs afoul of a separate 
holding by the Supreme Court that plaintiffs need not exhaust all ad­
ministrative remedies for constitutional claims under§ 1983. This Note 
concludes that, even though the finality requirement imposes modest re­
strictions on litigation in federal court, the requirement helps protect the 
integrity of local planning processes and satisfies concerns among 
courts about their own role in land use disputes. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF 
RIPENESS 
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that courts may employ for ei­
ther constitutional or prudential reasons to dismiss a variety of constitu­
tional claims.23 Courts may invoke the ripeness doctrine when a dispute 
has not yet generated injury significant enough to satisfy the case or 
controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitu­
tion.24 When used to ensure that a complainant has suffered injury, the 
ripeness doctrine "prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of prema­
ture adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagree-
23. There is debate among courts and commentators as to whether the ripeness 
doctrine is grounded in the case or controversy requirement of Article III or is better 
characterized as a prudential limitation on federal jurisdiction. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 
1289-90 & n.6 (citing cases); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 5 4  U. 
Cm. L. REv. 153 (1987) (emphasizing prudential nature of ripeness and protesting at­
tempts by Burger Court to constitutionalize the doctrine). This Note assumes that ripe­
ness has both constitutional and prudential aspects, see generally 13A CHARLES ALAN 
Wrumrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3532.1 (2d ed. 198 4), but 
focuses on the prudential aspects for land use cases. 
2 4. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. On the constitutional as­
pect of ripeness, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 2. 4.1, at 1 1 4  ("Specifically, the 
ripeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because the in­
jury is speculative and never may occur, from those cases that are appropriate for fed­
eral court action."). 
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men ts, "25 and hence maintains the limited role for federal courts pro­
vided by the Constitution.26 
Even if plaintiffs demonstrate concrete injury sufficient to satisfy 
the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy, courts may de­
cide that particular lawsuits are not ripe for judicial review because of 
prudential concerns. These concerns are "prudential," because they are 
not required by the Constitution; rather, courts invoke them at their own 
discretion.27 One prudential concern is the importance of the substantive 
constitutional right under scrutiny compared to other constitutional 
rights. A court may "hone[] and adjust[] its exercise of substantive [ju­
dicial] review" by applying a more burdensome ripeness requirement to 
less important statutory or constitutional causes of action.28 Other pru­
dential concerns include the accuracy29 and efficiency30 of judicial deci­
sionmaking, as well as proper deference by federal courts to state insti­
tutions.31 In this respect, "ripeness is best understood as a malleable 
tool of judicial decision making serving a number of interrelated pur-
25. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), quoted in LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (2d ed. 1988). 
26. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, §§ 2.1-2.4 (discussing function of 
justiciability doctrines of standing and ripeness). 
27. See id. § 2.4.1, at 116; TRIBE, supra note 25, at 82; WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 23, § 3532.1, at 115, 118. 
28. Nichol, supra note 23, at 170; see also id. at 167 (stating "the 'court actually 
does make a decision on the merits when it purports to choose the context in which the 
decision will be made' " (quoting G. Joseph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the 
Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1443, 1522 (1971))); cf. 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.3, at 159-63 (suggesting that because ripeness 
analysis "may be complicated . . .  by the fact that some rights are more jealously pro­
tected than others," courts employ a lower ripeness threshold for claims implicating 
First Amendment rights, interests in privacy, and statutory rights "affected with particu­
lar public interests," such as those in patent litigation). Although Professor Nichol 
seems to recognize the awkwardness of using what is supposed to be a justiciability 
doctrine for substantive review, he does not "argue that this use of the doctrine is ille­
gitimate." Nichol, supra note 23, at 169. 
29. Ripeness helps to foster accurate judicial decisionmaking by requiring parties 
to develop adequate factual records. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 2.4.1, at 116; 
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 23, § 3532.3, at 149; Nichol, supra note 23, at 177-78. 
30. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 2.4.1, at 116; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
23, § 3532.3, at 146-47; Stein, supra note 11, at 11. 
31. The concern about comity to state institutions reflects the normative goal 
under the United States' system of federalism of preserving state and local autonomy by 
deferring to state institutions the power to decide an appropriate range of substantive is­
sues. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 121 (stating that "[c]oncern for 
the relationships between federal courts and state institutions may weigh in the ripeness 
balance"); Nichol, supra note 23, at 178 & n.154 (citing Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 158, 200 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
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poses. "32 However, courts must balance these broad prudential concerns 
about judicial decisionmaking against the "hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration. "33 Courts may not consider the institu­
tional benefits of postponing judicial review in isolation from the actual 
harm that may be suffered by the complainant. 34 
II. RIPENESS AS A PRUDENTIAL MEANS To DEFINE THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION: WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND MACDONALD 
The United States Supreme Court has not established a ripeness 
test for as-applied substantive due process claims brought by landown­
ers against local governments.35 However, the Court created a ripeness 
test for regulatory takings claims in Williamson County Regional Plan­
ning Commission v. Hamilton Bank36 and MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County.31 Section II.A demonstrates that the ripeness test 
set forth in Williamson County and MacDonald constitutes a prudential 
redefinition of the cause of action for takings claims, motivated in part 
by the Supreme Court's lower regard for certain Fifth Amendment just 
compensation rights, as compared to other rights. Section Il.B contends 
that the Court's temperate view toward Fifth Amendment just compen­
sation rights in the land use context gives lower courts reason to incor­
porate a finality requirement into the ripeness test for substantive due 
process claims. 
A. Williamson County and MacDonald 
In Williamson County, a Tennessee landowner brought a takings 
claim38 against the county planning commission under§ 1983 after the 
32. Nichol, supra note 23, at 176; cf. WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 
130 (stating that "[r]ipeness cases have generated a functional approach that directly 
weighs the importance of the interest advanced; the extent of injury or risk; the diffi­
culty of deciding the substantive issues and the allied need for specific factual illumina­
tion; and the sensitivity of the issues in relation to future cases, the states, and other 
branches of the federal government"). 
33. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 1 49 (1967), quoted in Nichol, supra 
note 23, at 17 4-75. 
3 4. To the extent a court considers the type of alleged injury in assessing the hard­
ship to the parties of withholding judicial review, the two prudential policies outlined 
above - one relating to the court's view of the underlying cause of action, and one re­
lating to role of the court as a decisionmaker - merge. 
35. See, e.g., Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
36. 473 U.S. 172 ( 1985). 
37. 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
38. For a definition of a regulatory takings claim, which may be cast as either a 
due process claim or a Fifth Amendment just compensation claim, see supra note 4. 
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comm1ss1on refused to approve the development plans of the land­
owner's predecessor in interest to the property.39 The lower courts deter­
mined that the commission's retroactive application of new regulations 
to the plaintiff's property constituted a taking. The Supreme Court re­
versed and dismissed the suit on the ground that the landowner's claim 
was not ripe for review.40 The Court held that, in order for a takings 
claim to be ripe for review by a federal court, the landowner must first 
obtain a final decision from the appropriate government authorities on 
the application of the regulations to his or her property, and then utilize 
any procedures available in state court for obtaining just compensation. 
The Court's finality requirement demanded that the landowner make at 
least one development proposal to the government and, if that proposal 
was rejected, an application for a variance.41 Here, the landowner - a 
bank - had failed to obtain a final decision from local authorities by 
seeking variances that would have allowed it to develop the property 
according to its proposed plat. 42 
39. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175. The landowner-respondent also had 
alleged that the commission's refusal to approve its predecessor-in-interest's plan vio­
lated the respondent's rights to substantive and procedural due process and denied it 
equal protection, but these claims were settled against the landowner-respondent in dis­
trict court See 473 U.S. at 182 n.4. 
40. See 473 U.S. at 1 82-85. 
41.  See 473 U.S. at 1 86-88. The Court based its holding on finality on its deci­
sions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 
(1981) (decision not final until the landowner applies for a variance), Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (decision not final until landowner submits at least one 
development proposal to the appropriate governmental entity for consideration), and 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (decision not 
final until the landowner submits second development proposal that is less ambitious 
than the first). 
42. The landowner also had not shown that state inverse condemnation procedures 
were unavailable or inadequate. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187-88, 196-97. 
Virtually all courts determining the ripeness of as-applied arbitrary and capricious sub­
stantive due process claims have held that plaintiffs bringing these claims need not seek 
compensation in state court to make them ripe for review. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 
F.3d 970, 977 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1993); Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 97 
(2d Cir. 1992) (following Sinaloa Lake Owners Assn. v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 
1398, 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989)); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 n.16 
(1 1th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court, by focusing on the unique language of the Just 
Compensation Clause, seemed to imply that the requirement of a state proceeding ap­
plied only to takings claims. The Constitution does not prohibit the taking of property 
per se, only the taking of property without just compensation. See Williamson County, 
473 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). Therefore, according to the Court, "if a State pro­
vides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot 
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and 
been denied just compensation." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195; see also Eide, 
908 F.2d at 725 n.1 6  ("[T]he just compensation hurdle applied in the just compensation 
claim context does not apply to arbitrary and capricious due process claims" because 
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In MacDonald, decided the following term, the Supreme Court ex­
panded upon the finality requirement set forth in Williamson County.43 
The Court held that even though the petitioner had done more to ripen 
his case than landowners in previous cases - he had submitted one de­
velopment proposal and received a response thereto44 - nevertheless 
there remained "the possibility that some development [would] be per­
mitted, and thus [the Court was] in doubt regarding the antecedent 
question whether appellant's property [had] been taken."45 Hence, in or­
der to satisfy the finality prong of the ripeness test, the petitioner 
needed to reapply for approval of a less ambitious plan to ensure that 
no development would be permitted.46 
"an arbitrary and capricious act by a government is unconstitutional even if the govern­
ment pays just compensation." (citation omitted)). But cf. Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 
551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding on nonripeness grounds that plaintiff does not state a 
substantive due process claim without alleging a violation of some other substantive 
constitutional right or that available state remedies are inadequate (citation omitted)). 
The fact that the Court in Williamson County nominally had decided a substantive 
due process claim also has not affected the ripeness tests devised by lower courts for as­
applied arbitrary and capriciou� substantive due process claims. The landowner­
respondent in Williamson County had attempted to characterize his injury not as a tak­
ing in violation of the Just Compensation Clause, but as a taking resulting from an inva­
lid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The landowner argued that, because it was a violation of due process, the 
landowner was not obligated to seek just compensation through procedures provided by 
the state in order to ripen its claim. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 173, 197-200. 
However, this argument only changes the claim to a due process takings claim, not an 
arbitrary and capricious due process claim - the type principally discussed in this 
Note. See supra note 4 (distinguishing the "due process takings claim" from the arbi­
trary and capricious substantive due process claim). Therefore, the Court's holding that 
the landowner's claim - even if categorized as a substantive due process claim -
should be dismissed because the landowner had failed the finality requirement, see Wil­
liamson County, 473 U.S. at 173, 197-200, has no bearing on the controversy among 
lower courts over the ripeness test for arbitrary and capricious substantive due process 
claims. 
43. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53 
(1986). MacDonald involved a landowner in California whose subdivision plan was re­
jected by a local planning commission and, on appeal, by the county board of supervi­
sors. The landowner had immediately filed an action in California state court seeking 
declaratory and monetary relief for inverse condemnation. See 477 U.S. at 342-44. 
44. See 477 U.S. at 351-53 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172; San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255 (1980)). 
45. 477 U.S. at 352-53. Although the Court in MacDonald did not expressly fault 
the landowner for failing to apply for a variance, presumably no variance process was 
available under state or local Jaw that would have allowed the landowner to overcome 
the county's previous denial of his subdivision proposal. See 477 U.S. at 351 (stating 
that reapplication requirement, like variance requirement, was means for government to 
arrive at " 'final, definitive position' " (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191)). 
46. The Court in MacDonald also briefly considered whether the plaintiff had 
been excused from attempting to satisfy all elements of the finality requirement on the 
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In both Williamson County and MacDonald, the Court justified the 
finality requirement on the theory that it could not determine whether 
the government took the landowner's property until the government 
fully applied existing regulations to the property. A takings claim often 
demands that a court make fact-intensive, technical determinations of 
the economic impact of a regulation upon a given property.47 The re­
quirement that landowners first attempt to obtain relief through admin­
istrative channels allows a more accurate assessment of the degree of 
development permitted on the land, and therefore whether the applica­
tion of the regulation constitutes a taking.48 The Court made this ratio­
nale explicit in MacDonald, where it stated that a "court cannot deter­
mine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far 
the regulation goes. "49 
Regardless of whether one agrees with the content of the elaborate 
finality requirement for takings claims,50 commentators accurately de­
scribe the creation of this requirement as motivated by prudential con-
ground that such efforts would have been futile. The Court concluded that the land­
owner's allegation of futility had been dismissed legitimately by the courts below. Al­
though the Court implied that the exception would constitute an acceptable argument in 
other circumstances, it held that reapplications by a landowner could not be futile as 
long as the government might still permit less valuable development. See 411 U.S. at 
352 n.8. 
47. Among the factors the Court must consider in deciding takings cases are the 
"economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with 
reasonable investment-backed expectations." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191. 
48. See 473 U.S. at 191. 
49. 477 U.S. at 348. 
50. Compare Kassouni, supra note 14, at 2, 11 (criticizing ripeness test as 
"stretched beyond its rational limits" and complaining that additional ripeness require­
ments tacked on for prudential reasons will simply "prevent most middle-class property 
owners from pursuing their constitutional right to just compensation") with R. Jeffrey 
Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases From Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 101 (1994) (observing that ripeness test for takings 
does not in practice impose onerous burdens on landowners and has allowed subsequent 
lower federal courts "to create a predictable and understandable body of law"). 
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992), generated minor speculation over whether the Williamson County and MacDon­
ald holdings are still good law. In Lucas, the South Carolina Supreme Court had 
deemed the plaintiff's takings claim to be ripe, even though after he filed his lawsuit the 
law prohibiting development of his property - here two parcels of beachfront property 
- was amended to allow landowners to apply for special permits. The United States 
Supreme Court, in reversing the South Carolina court's determination that the beach­
front regulation did not constitute a taking, also sidestepped the ripeness issue and did 
not require the petitioner to apply for one of these permits before creating a ripe claim. 
See 505 U.S. at 1011-13. This decision is best seen not as a weakening of the finality 
requirement, but as a backhanded rejection by the Court of attempts by the South Caro­
lina legislature retrospectively to interpose additional ripeness barriers to the lawsuit of 
the landowner, who had already gone two years without a special permit option. See 
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cerns.51 To say that courts need to determine "how far" regulations go 
is not to say that finality is required by the Constitution. Certainly the 
technical nature of the takings claim, which requires courts to make "ad 
hoc factual inquiries with respect to particular property, particular esti­
mates of economic impact, and ultimate valuation," helps justify an 
elaborate finality requirement as part of ripeness.52 But the Court in Wil­
liamson County and MacDonald simply could have required the land­
owners to carry their burden of proof that the applications of regula­
tions constituted takings of their properties. 53 Instead, the Court 
mandated the use of local administrative processes as prerequisites to 
judicial review. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in MacDonald that finality 
requires a reapplication by the landowner makes sense only if finality is 
viewed as driven by prudential concerns. Once the government rejects 
the landowner's initial application for development, a court would be 
hard pressed to find in the Constitution any guidance on the number of 
reapplications that should be required in order for the government's de­
cision to be final.54 In other words, there seems to be no logical point at 
which a denial of a particular application for development denies a 
landowner all beneficial use of his or her property. For every proposal 
that is rejected, there is always another alternative use for the property 
that would preclude a takings claim, up until the point at which a pro­
posal is submitted that allows the landowner no use at all. A landowner, 
of course, would have no reason to submit such a proposal. 
WRIGHT ET AL .• supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 68 (Supp. 1996); Stein, supra note 11, at 
24. 
51. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.1, at 78 (Supp. 1996) (asserting 
that "[c]oncerns of ripeness, deference to state procedures, and substantive constitu­
tional principle seem to be mingled in the ripeness ruling in Williamson County"); Kas­
souni, supra note 14, at 11; Nichol, supra note 23, at 164-67, 181. 
52. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.3, at 154 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Sur­
face Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 293-97 (1981)); see also infra Part III 
(discussing the broad prudential justifications of ripeness). 
53. See Kassouni, supra note 14, at 30 (arguing that the Supreme Court "relied on 
substantive takings principles" in its ripeness holding in MacDonald; "[i]f a property 
owner submits evidence that the denial of just one development application works a 
taking, there is no logical reason why the claim is not ripe. The property owner need 
only convince a trier of fact that lesser uses would not be economically viable."). But 
cf. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 80 (using takings cases as examples where "the constitu­
tional ripeness of the issue presented depends more upon a specific contingency needed 
to establish a concrete controversy than upon the general development of the underlying 
facts"). 
54. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 24 (noting that MacDonald opinion fails to in­
dicate "[j]ust how many other proposals must be submitted to establish a ripe claim"). 
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As noted by commentators, the prudential concern primarily re­
sponsible for the Court's elaborate finality requirement in Williamson 
County and MacDonald was its lower prioritization of Fifth Amend­
ment just compensation rights arising in the land use context.SS Al­
though Williamson County and MacDonald set forth the three-part final­
ity requirement as part of the test for ripeness, the creation of the 
requirement also constituted a redefinition of the underlying cause of 
action - i n  these cases a takings claim.s6 No doubt other prudential 
concerns also gave rise to this finality requirement;s7 however, the ex­
tent to which the Court has required landowners to pursue local avenues 
of redress is best explained by the Court's temperate view of landown­
ers' constitutional rights to develop their properties. 
B. The Prudential Use of Ripeness to Redefine the Cause of Action 
for Substantive Due Process Claims 
The same prudential concern motivating the Supreme Court's use 
of ripeness to redefine the cause of action for takings claims justifies a 
similar redefinition for substantive due process claims. Substantive due 
process claims by landowners do not implicate rights that deserve more 
judicial scrutiny than landowners' Fifth Amendment rights to just com­
pensation.ss Moreover, substantive due process claims are not accompa-
55. "Suffice it to say that even the framers of the fifth amendment saw the wis­
dom of enumerating life, liberty, and property separately, and that few of us would put 
equal value on the first and the third." Tahoe-Si!!rra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1338 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.), 
revd., 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991), quoted in Kassouni, supra note 14, at I; see also id. 
at 11; Nichol, supra note 23, at 165 (arguing that Williamson County and First Amend­
ment cases in which the Court employed a low ripeness threshold "tell us far more 
about the demands of the takings clause and the first amendment, respectively, than 
about the requisites of article ill"); id. at 181. 
56. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 181 (contending that by creating components of 
finality in Williamson County the Court merely redefined the elements of a cause of ac­
tion - "hardly the work of Article ill"). 
57. See infra note 81 (describing other prudential concerns motivating the Court's 
holding in Williamson County). 
58. See, e.g., Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(imposing "heavy burden" of proof on plaintiffs in land use context on ground that 
"the protection from governmental action provided by substantive due process has most 
often been reserved for the vindication of fundamental rights"); Lemke v. Cass County, 
846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) ("I see no reason to read the 
Due Process Clause as a constitutionalized Administrative Procedure Act setting up the 
federal courts as a forum for the review of every run-of-the-mill land-use dispute."), 
quoted in Wiener, supra note 8, at 406-07. 
Fifth Amendment just compensation rights perhaps receive greater attention than 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, but not vice versa. This is evi­
denced by the Supreme Court's holding that substantive due process claims may not be 
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nied by circumstances that make the landowners' plight more sympa­
thetic. Broadly speaking, the substantive due process claim is another 
arrow in the quiver of landowners who seek to minimize the effects of 
land use regulation and maximize the development value of their 
properties. 59 
Given the similar status of Fifth Amendment just compensation 
rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process property 
rights, the Supreme Court's logic that local governments cannot "take" 
property until they have sufficient opportunity to fully apply existing 
regulations provides an analogy for the ripeness inquiry for substantive 
due process claims. For these latter claims, courts should reason that 
one administrative setback for a landowner does not necessarily consti­
tute an arbitrary and capricious "act" within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause. "Acting," like "taking," may be broken down analyti­
cally into smaller steps. It makes just as much sense to say that a gov­
ernment cannot "act" without considering an application and a variance 
as it does to say that a government cannot "take" without doing the 
same. There is no absolute point at which either government activity 
may be complete and reviewable by a court. Courts may define "tak­
ing" and "acting" in a manner that fairly balances the interest in quick 
judicial remedies on the part of landowners with the interest in effective 
land use regulation on the part of local govemments.60 Hence, a local 
made if another more specific, enumerated constitutional claim is available. See Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Although Graham involved allegations of exces­
sive force by police, implicating a violation of the Fourth Amendment, one lower court 
recently has held that where plaintiffs bring both takings and substantive due process 
claims, the former subsumes the latter. See Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 
704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996). But see Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211  (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that limitation on substantive due process claims enunciated in Gra­
ham does not apply in zoning cases); MANDELKER, supra note 6, § 2.36, at 57. 
59. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 
1988) (Posner, J.) (commenting that alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments "present[] a garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of 
constitutional law"). 
60. This definition of substantive due process rights is in accord with the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Monell v. Departnient of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in 
which it held that municipalities could be liable in damage actions for arbitrary and ca­
pricious behavior under § 1983 only when the alleged violation is pursuant to govern­
ment "policy." See BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1257 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] 
(discussing Monell). One might argue that a statute passed by a town council which on 
its face prohibits development in a particular instance manifests a clear government pol­
icy. This argument is undermined, however, by the ad hoc nature of land use decision­
making. See infra text accompanying note 130. Given the good possibility that what ap­
pears to be a clear ordinance may be modified in practice by its application to a specific 
piece of property, the better view of the Monell holding is that it requires a landowner 
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government does not decide arbitrarily to reject a development project 
when it creates a land use ordinance that on its face prohibits a particu­
lar kind of development desired by an individual landowner. It only re­
jects a project after the landowner actually submits a development pro­
posal and gives the government sufficient opportunity to make a 
decision on that proposal. 
Under this modified conception of arbitrary and capricious "ac­
tion," the finality requirement for substantive due process claims should 
demand that landowners make an initial application and apply for a va­
riance or other appropriate administrative relief before bringing their 
claims in federal court. Courts should construe the variance component 
liberally. The variance component means that landowners should be re­
quired to pursue other methods of administrative relief if those methods 
are more appropriate than a "variance" as traditionally conceived.61 The 
variance component, which allows the locality to exercise all available 
forms of decisionmaking on the landowner's particular desired use, also 
requires that the landowner use all available avenues of administrative 
appeal for an adverse decision on an initial application.62 Courts that al­
ready require an initial application and an application for a variance63 
recognize the importance of allowing multiple government actors to 
participate in a land use decision before calling the decision "final. "64 
to submit an initial application and an application for a variance, see infra text accom­
panying notes 61-64, in order to ascertain the true governmental "policy" with respect 
to her property. 
61. See Wiener, supra note 8, at 392 (broadly referring to the variance requirement 
set forth in Williamson County as the "administrative relief element"). Other forms of 
administrative relief include a special exception, a special use permit, and a conditional 
use. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1 ,  at 468-76 (distinguishing these forms of 
administrative relief from a variance). 
62. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 976 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding unripe sub­
stantive due process claim arising out of denial of building permit, where development 
plan had already been approved by state, on ground that plaintiff had not appealed to 
Board of Adjustment); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1289 
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding unripe substantive due process claim arising out of revocation 
of lessor's permit on ground that plaintiff failed to reapply for use permit, appeal the 
revocation decision to the Township Zoning Hearing Board, or seek a variance or spe­
cial exception); cf. Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706-07 (holding plaintiff 's takings claim unripe 
on ground that landowner failed to appeal to the Board of Adjustment and seek "a vari­
ance or waiver" from the certificate of noncompliance issued by government 
employee). 
63. See cases cited supra note 20. 
64. The Third Circuit has stated that the Supreme Court's decisions in Williamson 
County and MacDonald, "[i]n the context of land use decisions . . .  require state zoning 
authorities be given an opportunity to 'arrive[] at a final, definitive position regarding 
how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question' before its 
owner has a ripe constitutional challenge based on the disputed decision." Taylor, 983 
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Some courts, however, have argued that the finality requirement 
has no bearing at all on substantive due process claims.65 This logic has 
allowed a substantive due process claim to be ripe for review when the 
town zoning board had not yet issued a decision on the variances re­
quested by the developer.66 This approach ignores the analogy that 
lower courts should make to the Supreme Court's holdings in William­
son County and MacDonald. 
The same criticism can be made, albeit to a lesser extent, of courts 
that require an initial application for a development proposal but no ap­
plication for a variance.67 Even though these courts recognize the im­
portance of the finality requirement for substantive due process 
claims,68 their version of finality potentially deprives the local govern­
ment of opportunities to consider fully the landowner's desired use. It 
therefore contradicts the notion that a unitary government action, at 
F.2d at 1291 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton 
Banlc, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985)) (alteration in original). 
65. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1992); cases cited 
supra note 17. In Pearson, the Sixth Circuit held that a substantive due process claim 
arising from a "routine denial of a zoning change," 961 F.2d at 1213, by a small 
defendant city in Michigan was ripe for review without an application for a variance or 
other administrative relief. After the city council had rejected the plaintiff 's rezoning 
application, as well as an amended site plan and additional zoning request, the plaintiff 
had brought suit alleging that the rejection was arbitrary and capricious, depriving him 
of substantive due process of law. See 961 F.2d at 1214. The court could have held that 
the complaint met at least a lenient version of the finality rule, although the plaintiff 
had not applied for a variance and hence could not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's "stricter 
test" - despite a statement by the Pearson court to the contrary. Instead, the court rea­
soned that in as-applied substantive due process claims, where there was no need to de­
cide whether the plaintiff's property had ·been taken and whether he had been denied 
just compensation, an easier ripeness standard was to be applied. See 961 F.2d at 1215. 
For commentary supporting the Sixth Circuit's position, see Kassouni, supra note 14, at 
46; Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Deci­
sions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use 
Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91,  91  n.l (1994). 
66. See Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
The landowner in Dubuc complained that the zoning board of appeals intentionally 
delayed making a decision on the application for a variance. The court, following Pear­
son, held that a variance was not required. However, the ·requirement that the board of 
appeals make a final decision would not have put the landowner in a "catch 22," as the 
court suggested, see 810 F. Supp. at 871 n.2, because the landowner still could have 
proven that seeking a final decision would have been futile. Other courts in the Sixth 
Circuit have also confirmed the approach in Pearson that ignores finality for substantive 
due process claims. See Millington Homes Investors, Ltd. v. City of Millington, No. 94-
5482, 1995 WL 394143, at *8 (6th Cir. July 3, 1995). 
67. See cases cited supra note 18. 
68. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (reasoning 
that finality requires at least one application by landowner because, "[i]f the authority 
has not reached a final decision with regard to the application of the regulation to the 
landowner's property . . .  in effect, a decision has not yet been made"). 
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least in the land use context, should be defined to include participation 
by all relevant agents. This least stringent finality test also creates a 
greater chance for confusion among courts as to which decision by the 
government is "final." A good example of this confusion occurs in 
Resolution Trust Corp . v. Town of Highland Beach.69 There the Eleventh 
Circuit first asserted that a "property owner's rights are violated the 
moment a governmental body acts in an arbitrary manner and applies 
that arbitrary action to the owner's property."70 Then, in an apparent 
bow to the finality requirement, the court determined that the plaintiff's 
injury occurred when the town reinterpreted an ordinance, "halting the 
completion of the [plaintiff's] project, and made it clear it would not 
compromise its reinterpretation that denied the joint venture . . . the 
benefit of its vested rights. "71 Presumably, a decision is final when it is 
"clear," but the court does not explain what distinguishes a clear deci­
sion from an unclear one. 
However, even a very broad conception of government action can­
not justify requiring a landowner, in order to obtain a final decision on 
her original development proposal, to give regulatory authorities the op­
portunity to consider a different, less ambitious development proposal.72 
The central inquiry in a substantive due process claim is whether the 
government acted arbitrarily and capriciously, not whether the govern­
ment took the landowner's property. A reapplication requirement might 
make sense when courts must determine whether the government has 
deprived the landowner of all beneficial use of her property. But where 
the landowner alleges that existing regulations entitled her to approval 
of her first application, then the question of whether further develop­
ment would be allowed is irrelevant.73 Courts holding that finality for 
69. 18 F.3d 1536 (11th Cir. 1994). 
70. 18 F.3d at 1547. 
71. 18 F.3d at 1547 (emphasis added). 
72. For cases applying the reapplication component to substantive due process 
claims, see supra note 21. 
73. See, e.g., Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(distinguishing MacDonald's reapplication requirement intended "to determine the ex­
act permitted level of development" as unique to takings claims), amending 834 F.2d 
1488 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 725 n.16 (11th Cir. 
1990) (distinguishing the requirement that the zoning decision "be finally made and ap­
plied to the property" from the requirement that the local authority make "all other de­
cisions necessary for the court to determine whether the landowner has been deprived of 
substantially all economically beneficial value of the property"). 
The Ninth Circuit in Herrington had issued an earlier opinion, amended by the 
opinion cited above, that more explicitly denied the relevance of the MacDonald reap­
plication requirement to substantive due process claims. See 834 F.2d at 1497. How­
ever, it does not appear from the amended opinion that the Ninth Circuit changed its 
view that the MacDonald reapplication requirement is uniquely tailored to the claim al-
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substantive due process claims requires at  least one reapplication by the 
landowner have failed to justify coherently this standard.74 
In addition, if after submitting an initial application it would be fu­
tile for the landowner to pursue a decision on this application, appeal an 
adverse decision, or apply for a variance, the landowner should be ex­
cused from doing so. This futility exception, adopted by virtually all 
circuits, provides justice to landowners who cannot use existing admin­
istrative processes because of the unwarranted manipulation of these 
processes by government agents.75 T he futility exception also allows 
landowners to bypass the variance component when the government of­
fers no such procedure for the type of application sought.76 In this way, 
courts can accommodate the many differences among land use ordi­
nances. Finally, in exceptional circumstances, the futility exception may 
excuse the pursuit of certain components of finality when the govern-
leging a deprivation of substantially all economically viable use of property. For a dif­
ferent reading of the amended opinion, see MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1,  at 161 
(claiming that Ninth Circuit applied ripeness rules from takings cases in amended opin­
ion but not in first opinion). 
74. This failure is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in Southview Associ­
ates v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), which involved a developer whose appli­
cation for a building permit for a residential subdivision - already downsized to ac­
commodate a deeryard which the developer discovered after purchasing the land - was 
denied by Vermont's District ill Environmental Commission on the ground that the pro­
posed development violated the state's growth control regulations. After unsuccessful 
appeals before Vermont's Environmental Board and Supreme Court, the developer sued 
the Board's individual members under § 1983. See 980 F.2d at 87-92. 
The Second Circuit held that Southview was required to submit at least one more 
development application to the state in order for the claim to be ripe for review. Al­
though the Vermont Environmental Board had applied state regulations "to the one par­
ticular subdivision proposal in question, it [had] yet to provide a 'final, definitive posi­
tion regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in 
question.' " 980 F.2d at 99 (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985)). However, in attempting to explain why a 
reapplication was required, the Southview court's only suggestion was that unless it had 
"a final decision before it, it [could not] determine whether a claimant was deprived of 
property and whether the government conduct was arbitrary and capricious." 980 F.2d 
at 97. This argument is unpersuasive, if not disingenuous. Southview could have sus­
tained a loss of a property interest if it was unjustly denied an opportunity to develop 
according to existing regulations. Also, the court did not need the benefit of knowing 
the fate of reapplications by Southview in order to determine whether the decision on 
the first application was arbitrary and capricious. 
75. For example, the government might unjustifiably delay consideration of an ap­
plication for development, hence making it impossible for the landowner to secure a re­
jection and proceed to satisfy the finality requirement. See, e.g., Dubuc v. Green Oak 
Township, 810 F. Supp. 867, 869 (6th Cir. 1992). 
76. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1232 n.4 (9th Cir. 
1994); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1 988). 
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ment unambiguously states at an early stage that it will not allow the 
landowner's desired use.n 
ill. RIPENESS AS A PRUDENTIAL TOOL OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONMAKING: BROAD POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING 
LANDOWNERS TO OBTAIN A FINAL DECISION 
Prudential concerns about the institutional capacity of federal 
courts to decide substantive due process claims further support the in­
corporation of a finality requirement into the ripeness test for these 
claims. These additional prudential concerns include the accuracy, effi­
ciency, and propriety of federal judicial decisionmaking at a given point 
in time. They should be distinguished from the prudential concern about 
the relative importance of the underlying cause of action78 because they 
broadly apply to all instances of judicial decisionmaking.79 However, 
even though prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking do not 
depend directly on the cause of action, substantive due process claims 
brought by landowners typically involve factual circumstances that ac­
centuate these concerns. Courts deciding substantive due process claims 
brought by landowners face the unpleasant task of interposing their 
bulky judicial apparatus on conflicts that are local and usually political 
in nature. They must resolve highly contextual questions such as what 
constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct and what constitutes an ap­
propriate remedy for the landowner. Hence, even if lower courts chose 
to ignore the Supreme Court's flexible view of property rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments80 - and declined to adopt a ripeness 
test for substantive due process claims derived from Williamson County 
77. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 
(9th Cir. 1990); He"ington, 857 F.2d at 570 (basing exercise of futility exception on 
government testimony that "the only means of obtaining approval of [plaintiff's] 32-lot 
proposal was through a General Plan amendment"). However, in no case should the fu­
tility exception excuse the submission of an initial development application. See, e.g., 
Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at 1232; Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 504. 
78. See supra Part II. 
79. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 176. 
80. One commentator expressed this view as follows: 
While freedom of speech is a fundamental constitutional right, there is no legal, 
moral, or prudential reason to grant it preferential status. Other constitutional 
rights, such as the right of just compensation for a taking of private property, are 
also worthy of judicial solicitude. As the Supreme Court once remarked in a dis­
cussion of standing requirements, "we know of no principled basis on which to 
create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of 
standing which might . . .  invoke the judicial power of the United States." 
Kassouni, supra note 14, at IO (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982)). 
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and MacDonald - they still would have to consider these additional 
prudential concerns and postpone decisionmaking accordingly. 
The difference between the concern about the underlying cause of 
action and broad concerns about judicial decisionmaking can be ex­
pressed in another way. The redefinition of the substantive due process 
cause of action turns ripeness into an inquiry that asks whether the al­
legedly arbitrary and capricious act has yet occurred. Courts must deter­
mine whether the government has indeed "acted" in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. By contrast, a ripeness standard driven by broad 
concerns about judicial decisionmaking is founded on the notion that, 
irrespective of whether the government has yet acted, courts should 
postpone deciding a case until they are competent or until it is wise to 
do so.81 
Unfortunately, although broad prudential concerns about judicial 
decisionmaking have affected lower courts' ripeness decision�' for sub­
stantive due process claims, the courts have neither fully identified 
these concerns nor systematically explained their importance. Rather, in 
a given case, a court typically makes isolated, somewhat unfocused ref­
erences to only one or two of these concerns. Section ill.A identifies 
four separate prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking that 
justify applying the finality requirement to substantive due process 
claims: the ability of courts to determine arbitrary and capricious behav­
ior, the ability of courts to fashion remedies, comity to state institutioqs, 
and judicial economy. This section also explains why each of these pru­
dential concerns provides less support for the reapplication component 
of finality than for the initial application and variance components. Sec­
tion ill.B argues that landowners should have to satisfy the initial appli-
81. In this respect, prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking are intended 
to stand as a justification for finality that is independent of the prudential concern about 
the underlying cause of action - and the analogy to the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Williamson County and MacDonald that the government does not "take" property until 
it makes a final decision - explicated supra, Part II. 
On the other hand, these two types of prudential concerns justifying ripeness are 
not mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court in MacDonald made reference, albeit brief, 
to prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking when it took note of the inherent 
flexibility of local agencies that make land use decisions. See MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) (" [L]ocal agencies charged with ad­
ministering regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institu­
tions; what they take with one hand they may give back with the other."). This mention 
of flexibility introduces concerns about the competence and economy of federal courts 
compared to state institutions. Moreover, to the extent the Supreme Court justified its 
takings ripeness test on the need for a more developed factual record, it based this test 
on a concern about judicial decisionmaking. Hence, it is possible for an amalgam of 
prudential concerns to justify the ripeness standard employed by courts for substantive 
due process claims. 
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cation and variance components in order to make their substantive due 
process claims ripe for review, but for fairness reasons should not have 
to satisfy the reapplication component. 
A. Four Prudential Concerns 
1. Ability of Courts to Ascertain Injury 
Courts may turn to the ripeness doctrine because they question 
their ability to decide certain issues at a particular point in time without 
a more developed factual record. This is especially true for substantive 
due process claims, where the issue is whether the government's behav­
ior may be characterized as "arbitrary and capricious." Given the 
highly contextual nature of the local land use decisionmaking process 
- complicated· further by the large variety of land use ordinances -
courts need a well-developed record to put the defendant's behavior into 
perspective. 82 
A finality requirement that includes the initial application and vari­
ance components helps satisfy the concern about the ability of courts to 
assess injury to landowners. In the event litigation ensues, courts benefit 
from an improved factual record that shows some degree of concrete 
harm to the landowner. Courts can better assess whether the govern­
ment's actions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently egregious to consti­
tute arbitrary and capricious behavior. 
However, the concern about a court's ability to assess injury does 
not strongly justify a finality requirement that also includes a reapplica­
tion requirement. The reapplication component would continue to im­
prove the factual record that eventually comes before the court because 
it would mandate at least one more instance of government decision­
making. But this continued improvement likely would be marginal, 
given that the government has had sufficient opportunity - through the 
initial application and variance components - to decide on the land­
owner's originally desired use. 
82. According to Professor Stein: 
The need for concrete facts is acute in land use Jaw, where so much litigation 
arises out of local ordinances about which there may be little reported case law. 
With a wide variety of different municipalities enacting land use Jaws and with 
few of these laws ever reaching the courts, those courts that are called upon to 
construe these statutes and ordinances need as complete a factual record as possi­
ble, so as to avoid making overly broad pronouncements. 
Stein, supra note 1 1, at 16  (citations omitted). 
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2. Ability of Courts to Fashion Appropriate Remedies 
Without a final decision by the government, federal courts may 
have difficulty not only ascertaining arbitrary and capricious behavior 
but also determining an appropriate remedy. This difficulty may extend 
to both injunctive relief and damages. State courts, which have had 
more occasions to decide remedies for arbitrary behavior by land use 
regulators, usually hesitate to grant site-specific injunctive relief to 
landowners out of fear of infringing on local legislative discretion.83 Al­
though federal courts, like state courts, can choose from a range of op­
tions for injunctive relief other than an order that permits immediate de­
velopment, 84 this choice may prove difficult to make and awkward to 
implement. 
More important, when calculating damages courts likely will en­
counter significant problems in determining the extent of economic in­
jury. One commentator prefers the measure of damages resulting from 
due process claims brought by landowners because they are "more flex­
ible than under takings jurisprudence";  in due process claims damages 
"need not be measured by the fair market value of the affected property 
interest, but by the actual economic damage inflicted by the regula­
tion. "85 Also, due process claims allow awards of punitive damages for 
proof of "evil motive or intent."86 But determining "actual economic 
damage" in the land use context is a burdensome task for courts. For a 
83. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 232-33 (discussing City of Rich­
mond v. Randall, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975)). 
84. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1504 (9th Cir. 1987), as 
amended, 857 F.2d 567 (1988) (affirming injunctive relief invalidating local govern­
ment's inconsistency determination, and awarding damages for delay, although injunc­
tion provided "no guarantee that a development proposal will ultimately be approved"); 
MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 233 (discussing alternatives to specific relief 
such as invalidation of current zoning or remand to local decisionmaking authority for 
reconsideration). Often, the nature of the plaintiff's allegations necessarily will make 
possible only limited injunctive relief. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726 
(11th Cir. 1990) (discussing hypothetical arbitrary rejection of landowner's application 
for rezoning in which "the remedy . . .  would not be an injunction requiring a grant of 
commercial zoning, but rather would be the overturning of the arbitrary decision, possi­
bly an injunction against similar irrational decisions, and other remedies depending on 
the situation"). 
85. Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1243; see also MANDELKER ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 189-90 (discussing advantages of remedies under § 1983). 
86. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1243; supra note 1 1 .  However, puni­
tive damages are not available against municipalities. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 190 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 458 U.S. 247 (1981)). 
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landowner deprived of a use to which she is entitled, a court must as­
sess damages resulting from delays87 and lost opportunity costs.BB 
A finality requirement may assuage the concern over assessing 
damages in at least three ways. First, finality will provide more oppor­
tunities for landowners and governments to reach compromises that in 
practice might prove superior to remedies devised by courts. B9 In this 
respect, finality serves as a prophylactic measure to ensure that all pre­
sumably superior compromise solutions are first attempted. Second, fi­
nality reveals a pattern of behavior on the part of individual government 
agents such that courts can determine whether their conduct was so 
egregious that punitive damages are justified. Last, by postponing litiga­
tion, finality prevents claims involving only speculative future damages 
- damages that are predicted to result from a denial of a particular use 
of the property.90 Where plaintiffs allege harm inflicted by a lost oppor­
tunity cost, the delay imposed by finality allows courts to focus, at least 
in part, on a fixed period of time in which landowners have suffered 
measurable, concrete injuries.91 
However, the concern about the court's ability to determine an ap­
propriate remedy does not support a finality requirement that includes 
the reapplication component. Even if a landowner successfully were to 
obtain permission on a second, less ambitious development proposal, 
she most likely would continue to suffer harm resulting from the 
wrongful denial of her original proposal. At least as a theoretical mat­
ter, she should still be allowed to sue for the damages caused by ad­
verse economic effects sustained as a result of not developing according 
to the initial development proposal. This remaining governmental liabil­
ity means that the reapplication requirement would not have advanced 
87. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 190-91 (showing complicated na­
ture of formula used by court in assessing damages for delays caused by arbitrary regu­
latory behavior (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 
1991))). 
88. See, e.g., Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris County, 89 F.3d 1481,  1489 
(11th Cir. 1996) ("A person whose property is affected by [an invalid zoning classifica­
tion] may recover damages for any injury the classification may have caused him 
. . . .  "); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1994). 
89. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d Cir. 
1993) (noting that finality may be required for ripeness because "land-use regulation 
generally affects a broad spectrum of persons and social interests, and . . .  local political 
bodies are better able than federal courts to assess the benefits and burdens of such leg­
islation" (citation omitted)). 
90. See Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1234. 
91.  Cf. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (inter­
preting Williamson County and MacDonald to require, for substantive due process 
claims as well as takings claims, "a final decision by the government which inflicts a 
concrete harm upon the plaintiff landowner"). 
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the goal of securing a presumably superior remedy - one that would 
preclude further litigation in federal court - through negotiations be­
tween the landowner and local government. 
One might counterargue that as a practical matter the landowner 
would hardly ever pursue litigation after receiving permission to de­
velop according to a modified proposal, and that therefore the interest 
in achieving a remedy through local negotiations continues to weigh 
heavily in favor of a reapplication requirement. Moreover, the reappli­
cation requirement would continue to advance the prudential interests in 
revealing patterns of conduct by individual government agents for the 
purpose of determining punitive damages, and in waiting until at least 
some of the landowner's alleged injury is fixed and measurable.92 Nev­
ertheless, because there remains the theoretical possibility that the land­
owner may bring suit even if she receives permission to develop ac­
cording to a modified proposal, the concern about judicial capacity to 
determine remedies does not support the reapplication component as 
strongly as it supports the initial application and variance components. 
3. Comity to State Institutions 
The incorporation of the finality requirement into the ripeness stan­
dard for substantive due process claims advances the normative goal of 
allocating a reasonably significant sphere of responsibility to local offi­
cials.93 State and local governments have traditionally exercised signifi­
cant discretion with respect to land use issues.94 A meaningful ripeness 
requirement supports the long-standing sense that allowing local gov­
ernments a degree of flexibility in both creating land use regulations 
92. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(fang, J., dissenting) (arguing that finality requirement should include reapplication 
component because otherwise "damages are not calculable"; "Any verdict based upon 
sheer speculation about the amount of damages is prone to be excessive because it is 
not constrained by the appropriate measure of actual damages."). 
93. See Nichol, supra note 23, at 178 (observing that ripeness "allows federal 
courts to give due respect to the scope of responsibilities to other government decision 
makers" and "limits any judicial proclivity to 'pre-empt and prejudge issues that are 
committed for an initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal' " (quot­
ing Public Serv. Commn. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246 (1952))). 
94. See Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1537 (1 1th Cir. 1995) ("Zoning pro­
vides one of the firmest and most basic of the rights of local control." (citation omit­
ted)); Tarlock, supra note 8, at 558; Armistead, supra note 6, at 794 (describing view 
"that federal courts should stay out of local government decisions" because of "con­
cern about both swelling litigation and overburdening local governments and officials 
with damage awards and federal judicial interference"). 
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and adjudicating disputes is one important manifestation of the United 
States' system of federalism.95 
Moreover, a ripeness standard that includes a finality requirement 
is consistent with existing Supreme Court doctrine that limits suits 
against state officials under section 1983 in federal court.96 Through this 
doctrine the Court has, according to one commentator, "preserve[d] its 
vision of appropriate state-federal relations."97 The Court "is reluctant 
to constitute the Due Process Clause as a font of tort law because to do 
so would displace traditional state authority and thereby alter longstand­
ing balances of power in the federal system. "98 Likewise, the finality 
requirement provides local governments with a small but legitimate 
sphere of flexibility in which to mediate competing interests in land use 
95. See, e.g., Tari, 56 F.3d at 1537 ("[I]f a local investigator's issuance of a cita­
tion was all that was necessary for a claim to ripen, the federal
-
courts would become 
'master zoning boards' in disputes which are best handled at the local level."); Eide v. 
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726 n.17 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (arguing in favor of finality 
requirement on ground that "zoning is a delicate area where a county's power should 
not be usurped without giving the county an opportunity to consider concrete facts on 
the merits prior to a court suit"); Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 
(9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that the ripeness requirements announced in Williamson County 
and MacDonald are applicable to all constitutional claims, because they erect "impos­
ing barriers . . .  to guard against the federal courts becoming the Grand Mufti of local 
zoning boards"), quoted in Stone & Seymour, supra note 4, at 1234; Mixon, supra note 
15, at 708 ("Basic principles of federalism and orderly process would obviously be bet­
ter served by deferring federal jurisdiction in land-use cases until claimants pursue and 
exhaust available state remedies."). 
96. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 309 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart 
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 646-
47 (1989)). 
97. Fallon, supra note 7, at 309. 
98. Id. at 350. Professor Fallon goes so far as to say, in light of cases already de­
cided by the Supreme Court, that federal courts should abstain altogether from hearing 
substantive due process claims against state governments where the states themselves 
provide adequate remedies through their judicial systems. See id. at 345 (arguing that 
the Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), that a state's provision of 
adequate postdeprivation judicial remedies can negate an allegation that due process 
was denied "would fit best into the surrounding doctrinal framework if it were 
recharacterized as launching a body of federal abstention doctrine" for substantive due 
process claims). That is not the argument here. The lower courts do not seem prepared 
to take this route, see supra note 42, and other commentators have demonstrated why 
abstention by federal courts for such claims should be discouraged. See Levinson, supra 
note 6, at 356; Annistead, supra note 6, at 792-97 (arguing that permitting substantive 
due process claims to proceed directly in federal court will not interfere with the pre­
rogatives of local government because of the high standard of proof that must be met by 
the plaintiff property owner). This said, to the extent the policy of maintaining federal­
ism supports an abstention doctrine for substantive due process claims, it also applies to 
the adoption for these claims of a ripeness doctrine that includes the finality 
requirement. 
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without fear of immediately incurring liability in federal court under 
section 1983. 
Again, however, this prudential concern justifies including the ini­
tial application and variance components in the finality requirement but 
not the reapplication component. Because the landowner theoretically 
would still be able to sue for harm inflicted by the government's refusal 
of the initial development proposal, even arrangements that allowed 
landowners to develop their properties would remain subject to the su­
pervision of federal courts. 
4. Judicial Economy 
A court that grounds a ripeness test on judicial economy con­
sciously defers adjudication of a dispute so as to conserve its judicial 
resources for other controversies.99 The court essentially engages in a 
cost-benefit analysis in order to maximize the value gained from judi­
cial review across a broad spectrum of disputes. 
Claims by landowners against local governments involving allega­
tions of arbitrary and capricious behavior in the application of land use 
regulations may be particularly susceptible to concerns about judicial 
economy for at least two reasons. First, governments apply land use 
regulations so often that the number of potential disputes is vast. Sec­
ond, the disputes themselves are extremely fact-intensive, requiring sig­
nificant expenditures of resources once they end up in court. 
One might argue that concerns about judicial economy should be 
of limited importance when constitutional rights are at stake. According 
to this view, the effects on federal dockets of securing justice for consti­
tutional violations are irrelevant. Courts have been clear, however, that 
the sheer volume of the land use caseload necessitates interposing barri­
ers to review.100 Moreover, the Supreme Court and some lower federal 
courts most likely had in mind these benefits of judicial economy in 
99. See Stein, supra note 1 1 ,  at 13 n.37 (noting that "withholding of federal judi­
cial intervention until the appropriate agency has completed its work . . .  allows cases to 
ripen with little or no expenditure of judicial resources"). 
100. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (refusing to rule on merits because court could not "imagine what zoning 
dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in this way, there to displace or post­
pone consideration of some worthier object of federal judicial solicitude"); Scudder v. 
Town of Glendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that the "[a]vailability 
of federal review of every zoning decision would only serve to further congest an al­
ready overburdened court system"). 
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their varied overtures to the virtues of local "flexibility." 101 Given the 
variability of many local land use decisions, it would be wasteful for 
federal courts to intervene when there is a good chance of the offensive 
decision being reversed by a later administrative action.102 However, 
like the prudential concerns about determining appropriate remedies and 
comity to local regulatory authorities, the judicial economy concern 
does not justify expanding the finality requirement to include the reap­
plication component, given that the development eventually permitted 
as a result of the landowner's modified proposal does not erase all of 
the local government's potential liability. 
B. Broad Prudential Concerns as Justification for Finality 
Prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking in their totality 
outweigh any harm to landowners inflicted by the initial application and 
variance components of the finality requirement. A landowner who ob­
tains permission to develop according to her original plans may sustain 
some adverse effects from the delay associated with the normal process­
ing of applications.103 However, the finality requirement will enable fed­
eral courts to assuage significantly concerns about their ability to assess 
injury, their ability to determine appropriate remedies, comity to state 
institutions, and judicial economy. 
Prudential concerns about judicial decisionmaking do not outweigh 
harm to landowners inflicted by the reapplication component of the fi­
nality requirement. The reapplication component would advance pru­
dential concerns in two general respects. First, in many cases it would 
continue to improve the factual records considered by courts. Second, in 
some cases the reapplication component possibly would enable land­
owners and local governments to reach compromises that preclude fur­
ther litigation - despite the theoretical possibility of a remaining cause 
of action - hence possibly easing courts' concerns about their ability 
101. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 
(1986); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d at 498, 503 n.5 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
102. See Southern Pacific, 922 F.2d at 503 n.5 (observing that the flexibility of lo­
cal zoning systems becomes "obviously useless if the property owners abandon their 
applications after rejection by civil servants with narrow authority and before seeking 
relief from a body with broader powers"). 
103. See, e.g., Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 796 F. Supp. 1320 (C.D. Cal. 
1992), affd., 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F. 
Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 12 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1993). The landowner can hold 
the government accountable for unreasonable delays. See, e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles, 
Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983); Eaton v. City of Solon, 598 F. Supp. 
1505 (N.D. Ohio 1984). 
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to determine appropriate remedies, comity to state institutions, and judi­
cial economy. 
But to the extent the reapplication requirement furthers prudential 
policies, courts must balance these policies against the hardship to the 
party of withholding judicial review.104 It would be unfair to require 
landowners to satisfy additional procedural requirements after the gov­
ernment has arrived at a final decision on the use for which the land­
owner is entitled.105 Although the reapplication component might make 
sense for takings claims, where the injury alleged is the deprivation of 
all substantial economically viable use of the property, it has no logical 
connection to a substantive due process claim, where the injury alleged 
is an arbitrary and capricious denial of a particular use. Even assuming 
that substantive due process property rights are not as highly cherished 
as other constitutional rights, courts should not gut them entirely for the 
sake of prudential concerns, which in these cases would be only margi­
nal and speculative.106 
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO FINALITY 
Although prudential concerns about the importance of the as-ap­
plied substantive due process claim and the accuracy, propriety, and ef­
ficiency of judicial decisionmaking weigh in favor of a finality require­
ment as a part of ripeness, one might still object to finality on four 
grounds - two theoretical and two practical. The finality requirement 
proposed in this Note might be challenged on the theoretical ground 
that it violates the Supreme Court's holding in Patsy v. Florida Board 
of Regents.107 Patsy held that plaintiffs bringing claims against state 
governments under section 1983 in federal court are not required first to 
exhaust state administrative remedies.108 A second objection, more prac­
tical in nature, is that a finality requirement would impose a costly bu­
reaucratic hurdle on middle class landowners and entrepreneurs who 
might go bankrupt or simply give up before securing a judicial remedy 
for arbitrary and capricious treatment by the government.109 The third 
objection, which is related to the second, is that the ripeness doctrine 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
105. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 29 (suggesting limitations on the reapplica­
tion requirement for takings cases given the "financial and emotional plight of property 
owners"). 
106. Cf. Kassouni, supra note 14, at 7 (arguing that " [c]ourts should not draw ar­
bitrary standards for determining when the impact of a regulation is significant enough 
to rise to the level of a 'hardship' "). 
107. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
108. See 457 U.S. at 516. 
109. See generally Kassouni, supra note 14. 
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encourages local governments to create administrative mechanisms for 
relief that in effect benefit the wealthier and politically connected seg­
ments of communities. The fourth objection - this one theoretical - is 
that a conscious decision by a federal court to postpone decision on an 
alleged violation of a constitutional right amounts to an abdication of 
the court's responsibility.110 
The finality requirement stipulates that landowners cannot sue in 
federal court after the first alleged instance of arbitrary and capricious 
behavior; rather, they must take certain administrative steps to ensure 
that the government has truly "acted." Hence, the components of final­
ity can be challenged as so similar to the components of administrative 
exhaustion that courts cannot require finality under Patsy. 
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that the rule in 
Patsy did not apply to the finality requirement for takings claims. The 
Court's reasoning in Williamson County strongly suggests that Patsy 
also does not apply to the finality requirement for substantive due pro­
cess claims. In Williamson County, the Court characterized the finality 
requirement as "concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has 
arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual con­
crete injury."l l l  By contrast, the exhaustion requirement forbidden by 
Patsy "refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an in­
jured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a rem­
edy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropri­
ate." 112 Hence, although landowners bringing takings claims might have 
to obtain a final decision by applying for a variance, they do not have 
to use state procedures that "clearly are remedial" or that "result in a 
judgment whether [the government's] actions violated any of [the land­
owners'] rights." m 
The "initial decisionmaker" theory used in Williamson County ap­
plies to the finality requirement for substantive due process claims for 
two reasons. First, both the government's decision on the landowner's 
initial application and on her application for a variance can be con-
1 10. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 8, at 387 ("Despite section 1983 and the 
Court's expression of civil rights actions belonging in court, landowners often find such 
support to be meaningless rhetoric."). 
1 1 1. Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 193 (1985). 
1 12. 473 U.S. at 193. 
1 13. This distinction, as applied to the case of the petitioner in Williamson County, 
meant that he was not required to appeal the rejection by the county planning commis­
sion of his preliminary plat application to the Board of Zoning Appeals, "because the 
Board was empowered, at most, to review that rejection, not to participate in the Com­
mission's decisionmaking." 473 U.S. at 193. 
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strued as activities of the "initial decisionmaker." This interpretation of 
the government's activities is consistent with the argument in Part II 
that the government has not truly "acted" until it renders decisions on 
the landowner's initial application and application for a variance. Sec­
ond, courts have distinguished finality from exhaustion by noting that 
the former "ensures that the issues and the factual components of the 
dispute are sufficiently fleshed out to permit meaningful judicial re­
view." 1 14 Hence, at least some of the prudential policies advanced by 
the initial application and variance components - namely, the policies 
of increasing the competence of federal courts to determine factual is­
sues and assess damages - match those already used by courts to jus­
tify finality despite Patsy. 
However, this Note's argument for a liberal construction of the va­
riance requirement115 may initially appear to contradict the Court's 
statement in Williamson County that landowners should not be required 
to pursue appeals that "clearly are remedial" in nature.1 16 This apparent 
contradiction may be reconciled for several reasons. Williamson County 
should be read ·as carving out a broad exception to the holding in Patsy 
for constitutional claims brought by landowners against local govern­
ments under section 1983. Commentators have repeatedly noted the 
similarity between the doctrines of ripeness and administrative exhaus­
tion, especially where ripeness is based on prudential considerations, 1 17 
and the Supreme Court reaff'rrmed the independence of the doctrines 
only in dicta.1 18 In fact, lower courts have given short attention to the 
statement in Williamson County barring "remedial" administrative ap­
peals in the land use context; they have not refrained from requiring 
landowners to appeal decisions of governmental entities in order to 
make their claims ripe for review.119 
114. Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871 (1990)). 
1 15. The variance requirement means that a final decision should include appeals 
by the landowner to all government agents with jurisdiction to pass judgment on the 
landowner's original desired use. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
1 16. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193. 
1 17. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3532.6, at 195. 
1 18. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192-93. 
1 19. See, e.g., Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 976 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that 
plaintiff had to appeal decision of county's Development and Licensing Division to 
board of adjustment to make claim ripe); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 
983 F.2d 1285, 1290-93 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (taking note of statement in Williamson 
County that exhaustion of state remedies is not required for takings claims but neverthe­
less holding that decision of zoning officer had to be appealed to hearing board before 
landowner's substantive due process claims would be ripe for review); cf. Bateman v. 
City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 706 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding takings claim unripe 
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This liberal construction of Williamson County's exception to Patsy 
is buttressed by other Supreme Court decisions that appear to limit 
Patsy's scope. The most important of these decisions is Parratt v. Tay­
lor, 120 in which the Court held that states do not deny due process to 
plaintiffs who seek postdeprivation remedies for the loss of property as 
a result of random and unauthorized acts of government officers, where 
the state provides adequate postdeprivation redress.121 Although a later 
case held that Parratt applies only to procedural due process viola­
tions, 122 a Seventh Circuit panel deciding a substantive due process 
claim recently reasoned that just as "[t]he Parratt doctrine had already 
created one exception to the principle that exhaustion of state remedies 
is not required in a federal civil rights suit . . . Williamson created an­
other." 123 One commentator goes even further in his interpretation of 
Parratt by arguing that the case should be viewed as creating an absten­
tion doctrine for certain substantive due process claims.124 
Finally, Patsy itself arguably should not apply to substantive due 
process claims arising in the land use context. Patsy involved an allega­
tion by an employee of a state university that the university had dis­
criminated against her on account of race and gender. It is debatable 
whether the Patsy Court intended its holding to extend to every other 
species of constitutional claim under section 1983, particularly claims 
by plaintiffs who do not allege that they have suffered injury as a result 
of being a member of a discrete and insular minority.125 Furthermore, 
commentators have speculated whether the Patsy Court "confuse[d] the 
because plaintiff failed to appeal issuance of certificate of noncompliance to city board 
of adjustment). 
120. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
121. See 451 U.S. at 543-44. 
122. See Zinennon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 1 13, 125 (1990). 
123. Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) 
(holding unripe landowner's due process takings claim); see also Mixon, supra note 15, 
at 713 (arguing for a broad interpretation of Parratt in the context of due process claims 
arising out of land use decisions). But see Levinson, supra note 6, at 350 (arguing de­
spite Parratt that substantive due process "focuses on whether the government has 
abused its power, and any violation is complete as soon as the act is committed"). 
124. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 344 ("When the Court's confusions are stripped 
away, Parratt held that there could be no federal remedy for the alleged substantive due 
process violation if a federally adequate scheme of remedies existed in state court."); 
supra note 98. 
Patsy is also limited by Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary, 454 
U.S. 100 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts, for reasons of 
comity, should not decide claims seeking remedies from state taxation, as long as the 
state provides remedies that are plain, adequate, and complete. See HART & WECHS­
LER, supra note 60, at 1352. 
125. See Stein, supra note 1 1, at 14 & n.47. 
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question of exhaustion of state remedies in general . . . with the ques­
tion of exhaustion of distinctively administrative remedies." 126 The fi­
nality requirement proposed in this Note - one which requires only ad­
ministrative appeals that pertain directly to the landowner's initial 
development proposal - would gain additional support from reading 
Patsy to bar only "state remedies in general." 
The practical concern for middle class property owners, especially 
those forced to negotiate with grossly unresponsive government offi­
cials who have political incentives to engage in arbitrary and capricious 
behavior, should not lightly be dismissed. Against this concern, how­
ever, one must consider the implications of failing to give flexibility to 
local governments to create and administer land use regulations. Sub­
jecting local governments to potential liability for every alleged in­
stance of wrongful behavior would encourage well-capitalized develop­
ers to use the threat of lawsuit to impose unwanted or illegal 
development plans on communities, regardless of the standard of con­
duct of the responsible government entity. The extension of the finality 
requirement to substantive due process claims recognizes, as one com­
mentator notes, "the real world interplay between developer and regula­
tor." 127 Furthermore, the threat of government over-reaching must be 
balanced against the evolving view that an individual parcel of real 
property is not just "a commodity" to be "intensively developed" and 
protected from "forced redistribution" by the state, but part of a larger 
ecological resource that should be protected by environmental land use 
regulation.128 Finally, for situations involving obvious bad faith on the 
part of governments, federal courts can use the futility exception to ex­
cuse certain components of finality and do justice in a given case. 
The other practical objection to ripeness focuses not on the barriers 
it poses to the middle class, but on the opportunities for certain land­
owners to receive preferential treatment. According to this argument, 
the more that land use decisionmaking becomes an ad hoc enterprise, 
the more certain individuals within communities will be able to use 
their wealth and influence to turn the variety of administrative processes 
to their advantage. Not only does this greater potential for corruption 
126. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1351 (comparing Patsy with the 
"Court's careful articulation of the judge-made rule that, subject to some limited excep­
tions, administrative remedies must be exhausted in suits challenging federal adminis­
trative action"). 
127. Lyman, supra note 50, at 104 n.12 (arguing for a uniform fmality require­
ment for takings and substantive due process claims). 
128. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 586, 595. 
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create an equal protection problem, but it also threatens to undermine 
the possibility of coherent land use planning.129 
However, it seems late in the day to speculate on whether local 
governments will engage in greater ad hoc decisionmaking as a result 
of the ripeness doctrine. Administrative processes allowing for case-by­
case application of land use policies already have entrenched them­
selves in the ordinances of most local governments. 130 Even if the ripe­
ness requirement were relaxed for most jurisdictions, this would not 
prevent certain members of communities from utilizing already existing 
administrative processes to gamer preferential treatment. In other 
words, ripeness only makes administrative processes mandatory; the ab­
sence of ripeness would do nothing to prevent the voluntary use of 
these processes by individuals and developers who deem it in their in­
terests to do so. 
As for the contention that courts must demonstrate equal vigilance 
for all alleged constitutional injuries, this position belies a misunder­
standing of the role of federal courts in a modem administrative state. 
Violations of constitutional rights do not give rise to an immediate 
cause of action in federal courts. The modem law governing rights to 
judicial review and rights to judicial remedies, as one commentator puts 
it, "den[ies] any absolute individual right to judicially dispensed correc­
tive justice." 131 It has a much more modest goal, which is to "affirm[] a 
supervening, quasi-managerial social interest in maintaining mecha­
nisms of judicial oversight that are adequate to keep government gener­
ally, albeit not perfectly, within the bounds of law." 132 
V. CONCLUSION 
Land use regulation has long played a vital role in maximizing the 
welfare of communities. Not only does it contribute to health and safety 
and improve aesthetics, but increasingly it helps protect valuable envi­
ronmental resources.133 These functions are becoming more important as 
time goes on. The shift in emphasis in environmental regulation from 
controlling toxic risks to preserving biodiversity will, as one commenta-
129. Accord MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1 ,  at 448-49 (observing that under 
certain conditions "zoning becomes a discretionary decisionmaking process rather than 
a system in which land uses are permitted as-of-right"); id. at 492 (noting a potential 
equal protection argument in cases of "spot zoning"). 
130. See id. at 197 (describing content of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, 
which has been substantially integrated into most state legislation). 
131. Fallon, supra note 7, at 339. 
132. Id. at 339; cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 1346-47 (summarizing 
virtues of judicial discretion). 
133. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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tor puts it, "place new environmental protection responsibilities and op­
portunities on local governments, the front line resource management 
units." 134 Land use regulations also allow local governments to comply 
with state growth management statutes, which states are enacting in in­
creasing number.135 
An underdeveloped ripeness standard that allows landowners to 
bring substantive due process claims against local governments upon 
the first manifestation of alleged arbitrary and capricious behavior 
would needlessly escalate the potential liability for governments. Fear 
of increased liability, in turn, would threaten the implementation of es­
sential regulatory activities. Such a threat would be imposed for the 
sake of a constitutional right which, although deserving of some judicial 
scrutiny, would arguably distract courts from attending to worthier com­
plaints that are better suited for federal judicial resolution. 
The requirement that landowners obtain a final decision on their 
desired land use before suing in federal court helps alleviate litigation 
pressures on land use regulators. Courts should impose this finality re­
quirement on two theories. First, by holding that governments do not in 
fact "act" until they issue a final decision, courts would be redefining 
the cause of action for violations of substantive due process in the same 
way that the Supreme Court has redefined the cause of action for tak­
ings claims. Second, courts should require finality to satisfy concerns 
about their own roles as decisionmakers. Courts appropriately assume 
that they have only a "quasi-managerial" interest in protecting land­
owners from arbitrary and capricious treatment by government agents 
applying use regulations.136 It is upon this relatively modest role as a 
broad overseer of property rights that the future of desirable land use 
planning and ecological protection, not to mention wise judicial deci­
sionmaking, may depend. 
134. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 556. 
135. See Jeffrey M. Eustis, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Growth Management 
Act Implementation that Avoids Takings and Substantive Due Process Limitations, 16 U. 
PuGET SOUND L. REv. 1 181 (1993) (describing goals of Washington State's Growth 
Management Act of 1991 and the consequent legal challenges to local governments 
under takings and substantive due process doctrines); see generally Eide v. Sarasota 
County, 908 F.2d 716 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (ruling against landowner who challenged appli­
cation of comprehensive plan adopted by Sarasota County, Florida, to comply with the 
state's Local Government Planning and Development Regulation Act). 
136. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 563 (arguing that "it is difficult but possible to 
integrate the 'imperatives' of biodiversity protection with the protection of individual 
rights within the framework of federal constitutional law and local government regula­
tory authority"). 
